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THE MOUNTAIN DEW DECISION IS HARD TO
SWALLOW: SAKON V. PEPSICO, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, Pepsico, Incorporated broadcast a commercial targeted at
young people on network television to advertise its product, Mountain
Dew soft drink.' The commercial showed young people riding bicycles
off an embankment and landing the bicycles in a body of water without
injury.2 This was done to the encouragement and delight of their peers.3
The Mountain Dew commercial did not contain a warning that such lake
jumping was dangerous or that viewers should not attempt it.
4
After watching the commercial, Michael Sakon, then fourteen years
old, tried to perform the stunt by riding his bicycle off an embankment
and into a creek.5 Instead of landing safely, however, Michael flew over
the handlebars, landed head first in the creek, broke his neck6 and was
rendered a quadriplegic.7
Michael Sakon' and his mother, Glenda Dragovich, filed a tort ac-
tion against Pepsico in Florida state court,9 claiming that the corporation
had "negligently portrayed the lake jumping activity as safe and [had]
failed to warn the targeted audience of immature viewers of the dangers
inherent in the activity."'" Sakon further alleged that "the commercial
incited and invited the young Plaintiff not only to purchase the adver-
tised product, but to imitate the activities depicted therein."I Based on
diversity jurisdiction, Pepsico removed the case to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida.' 2
At trial, moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief
1. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 2 (Fla. 1989).
2. Id. at 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 2. The Florida Supreme Court accepted the Eleventh
Circuit's statement of the alleged facts.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 3 (Fla. 1989).
7. Initial Brief of Appellants in the Supreme Court of Florida at 2, Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc.,
553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 73,258) (Fla. 1989).
8. By and through his natural mother and natural guardian, Glenda Dragovich. Sakon v.
Pepsico, Inc., No. 88-3207, slip op. at 1 (11th Cir. Oct. 27, 1988).
9. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 1.
10. Initial Brief of Appellants in the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals at 4-
5, Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 88-3207) (Fla. 1989).
11. Id.
12. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 2-3 (Fla. 1989).
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
could be granted, 13 Pepsico argued that the cause of action was barred by
the first amendment to the United States Constitution and that Sakon's
"complaint fail[ed] to allege a legal duty owed by defendant to Michael
Sakon, a breach of that duty and that any such breach was a proximate
or contributing cause to the accident and injury."' 4 In granting Pep-
sico's motion to dismiss, the trial court held that the suit was barred by
the first amendment' 5 and that Pepsico had no duty to warn. 6 The
court also held that Sakon had not alleged that Pepsico breached a duty
owed to him.' 7 Sakon then amended his complaint to assert that "the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has recognized a duty of advertisers
to avoid advertisements which would have a tendency to influence chil-
dren to engage in harmful activities, and that FTC has the obligation to
set the standards of duty owed by advertisers."'"
Pepsico moved to dismiss the amended complaint. 9 When the dis-
trict court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice,2' Sakon ap-
pealed the decision on the grounds that the court had abused its
discretion.2' The Florida Supreme Court answered the following certi-
fied question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit:
[w]hether the law of the state of Florida recognizes a duty owed
by a television advertiser to its targeted audience of young
viewers when that advertiser has broadcast, without adequate
warnings, a commercial depicting a dangerous activity in a
manner likely to induce a young viewer to imitate the activity.22
In Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc.,23 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the first amendment did not preclude Pepsico's liability and that under
the facts of the case, Pepsico could not be held legally liable.24 The court
concluded that Pepsico had not breached a duty and that the fourteen-
year-old boy's accident was not a foreseeable result of Pepsico's adver-
13. Id.
14. Sakon v. Mountain Dew, No. 86-483, slip op. at 2-4 (M.D. Fla. March 5, 1987).
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id.
18. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 86-483, slip op. at 1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 1988).
19. Id. Pepsico subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Initial Brief of Appellants in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals at 5, Sakon v.
Pepsico, Inc., (No. 88-3207).
22. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 1 (quoting Sakon, slip op. at 5); FLA.
CONST., art. V, § 3(b)(6) gave the court jurisdiction to answer the certified question.
23. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (Fla. 1989).
24. Id. at 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 7.
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tisement.25 In reaching its decision, the Florida court stated that no pre-
vious decision in the United States has imposed liability under facts
analogous to those in Sakon.26 However, in Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc.," the California Supreme Court imposed liability on a radio station
for a wrongful death proximately caused by a broadcast which created an
undue risk of harm to the decedent.28
This note examines the Sakon decision in light of Weirum and finds
its reasoning flawed, policy rationale unsound and conclusion incorrect.
As this note will show, the Florida Supreme Court has, in effect, granted
broadcast advertisers a license to air commercials in Florida that may
create an unreasonable risk of harm to young viewers. Network advertis-
ers must be aware, however, that immunity in Florida will not shield
them from liability for negligence in California and other states. This
note also suggests that broadcast advertisers do not need special protec-
tion; children do. Sound policy rationale suggests that courts should
hold broadcast advertisers to the general duty not to create an unreason-
able risk of harm to their young viewers and to a duty to warn when an
advertiser airs "a commercial depicting a dangerous activity in a manner
likely to induce a young viewer to imitate the activity."29
II. THE SAKON COURT'S DECISION
A. Holding Of The Court
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the first amendment did not
preclude Pepsico's liabilty and that under the facts of the case, Pepsico
could not be held legally liable.30 The court concluded that Pepsico had
not breached a duty and that the fourteen-year-old boy's accident was
not a foreseeable result of Pepsico's advertisement. 31 The court re-
manded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit for disposition of the matter.32
B. Reasoning Of The Court
1. The First Amendment Did Not Preclude Liability
The Supreme Court of Florida first addressed Pepsico's contention
25. Id., 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 8.
26. Id., 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 9.
27. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
28. Id. at 51, 539 P.2d at 42.
29. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 1.
30. Id at 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 8.
31. Id
32. Id at 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 12.
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that the Mountain Dew advertisement was protected by the free speech
clause of the first amendment. 3 Pepsico argued that the free speech
clause fully protected the advertisement because it did not fall into any of
the seven recognized exceptions to the first amendment.34 The company
claimed that commercial speech is not distinguished from other pro-
tected forms of speech under the first amendment, 35 and that except for
the seven exceptions, all televised material is protected.36 Based upon
these arguments, Pepsico urged the court to avoid involving itself in a
fruitless analysis of the content of all commercial and noncommercial
television broadcasts, and to decline to recognize a cause of action in this
case. 
37
The court, however, found Pepsico's first amendment arguments
"contrary to controlling case law' ' 38 and unpersuasive.3 ' The court
stated that the advertisement is not fully protected by the free speech
clause."° The court noted that although the United States Supreme
Court recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zen's Consumer Council,41 that the first amendment affords a degree of
protection to commercial speech,42 it did not eliminate the "common-
sense" distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.4 3 As
the Supreme Court made clear in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n," it
gave the former only "a limited measure of protection, commensurate
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values
33. Id. at 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 3.
34. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164-65, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 3. The seven unprotected areas that
Pepsico referred to are (1) obscene material, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); (2)
fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); (3) defamation, see
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); (4) invasion of privacy, see Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); (5) disruption of the classroom, see Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); (6) incitement of imminent
lawless activity, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); and (7) solicitation of illegal
activity, see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
35. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 165, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 4 (Fla. 1989).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 164-65, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 5.
39. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 7.
40. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 165, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 6 (Fla. 1989).
41. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
42. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 165, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 6.
43. Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
44. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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.... " Therefore, the Florida court ruled that it did not have to analyze
the content of noncommercial television.' Using "common sense,"47 it
could easily differentiate between commercial advertisements and en-
tertainment and news programs.48 The court, therefore, found itself free
to address the certified question.
2. The Certified Question of Law
After deciding that the first amendment did not preclude Pepsico's
liabilty, the Florida court addressed the certified question of
[w]hether the law of the state of Florida recognizes a duty owed
by a television advertiser to its targeted audience of young
viewers when that advertiser has broadcast, without adequate
warnings, a commercial depicting a dangerous activity in a
manner likely to induce a young viewer to imitate the activity.4 9
In answering the certified question of law, the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the district court's reasoning. 5°
a. The District Court's Reasoning
In order to establish a cause of action based on negligence, the dis-
trict court noted, Sakon was required to state the following elements:
(1) a duty or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the
actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the pro-
tection of others against unreasonable risk[;]
(2) a failure on his part to conform to the standard required;
(3) a reasonable close causal connection between the conduct
and the resulting injury;
(4) active loss or damage resulting to the interest of another.5'
The district court found that Pepsico owed no duty to Sakon.52 The
court stated that there must be a limit on the types of injuries for which
one must compensate another5" and that holding that Sakon had a cause
of action "would provide no standard for the television industry to fol-
45. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 165-66, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 6-7 (Fla. 1989)
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
46. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 165, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 7.
47. Id. at 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 7.
48. Id.
49. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 7 (Fla. 1989).
50. Id., 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 9.
51. Sakon v. Mountain Dew, No. 86-488, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Fla. March 5, 1987) (quoting
Simon v. Tampa Electric Co., 202 So. 2d 209, 213 (D.C.A. Fla. 1967)).
52. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 12 (quoting Sakon, slip op. at 6).
53. Id. at 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 11 (quoting Sakon, slip op. at 6).
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low."54 In response to Sakon's allegation that Pepsico had a duty to
warn viewers of the danger of attempting to lake jump, 5 the court asked
what warning would suffice to prevent liability.- 6 It noted that a warning
could be required to specify the depth of the water." If it were too deep,
the actor might drown.5" If it were too shallow, the jumper might hit the
bottom.59 A warning could be required to state the necessity for know-
ing how to swim or to include instructions in how to prevent the bicycle
from injuring the jumper.' The court asserted that it "should not under-
take to identify or set the standards to be followed by commercials of this
nature."
61
To establish Pepsico's liability, the court must find that Pepsico's
action was the proximate cause of Sakon's injuries as a matter of law.62
According to the court, "[p]roximate cause of an injury is that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.",63 The court found it no more reasonably
foreseeable that Michael Sakon would try to lake jump and be injured
than that an observer would attempt to imitate circus actors performing
high wire or trapeze acts on television." The court noted that Sakon did
not claim that the advertisement suggested that viewers attempt to lake
jump.6 ' Analogizing the Mountain Dew commercial to ski resort and
water skiing advertisements, 66 the court stated that the danger of injury
exists for the inexperienced who attempt the sports, but questioned
whether the advertiser's failure to warn constituted a breach of duty to
the viewer.67 The court concluded that Sakon had no cause of action for
negligence because Pepsico did not have a duty to warn and Sakon had
54. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 11 (Fla. 1989)
(quoting Sakon, slip op. at 6) (quoting Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp.
199, 202 (S.D. Fla. 1979)).
55. Id. (quoting Sakon, slip op. at 6).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 11.
59. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 11 (Fla. 1989).
60. Id. (quoting Sakon, slip op. at 6).
61. Id.
62. Id., 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 10 (citing Sakon v. Mountain Dew, No. 86-488 slip op. at 5-7
(M.D. Fla. March 5, 1987)).
63. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 10 (quoting Bryant v. School Board of
Duval County, Florida, 399 So. 2d 417, 420 (D.C.A. Fla. 1981)).
64. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 10 (quoting Sakon slip op. at 5).
65. Id., 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 11.
66. Id., 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 12.
67. Id. (quoting Sakon, slip op. at 6).
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not alleged a breach of duty owed to him.6"
2. The Supreme Court of Florida's Reasoning
The Supreme Court of Florida, upon finding that "Pepsico breached
no duty, and Sakon's accident was not the foreseeable consequence of
Pepsico's advertisement,"69 concluded that "under the facts alleged in
this case, Pepsico cannot be held legally liable."7 The court reasoned
that "Pepsico's commercial ha[d] done nothing more than portray young
people engaged in a sporting activity which can be dangerous if not done
by skilled persons under proper conditions."7 The court found that
Mountain Dew "had nothing to do with the activity"72 and that the com-
mercial was directed toward encouraging viewers to drink the soda and
not "to undertake the sport."73
The court stated that the doctrine of proximate cause is based on
policy decisions which include "the practical need to draw the line some-
where so that liability will not crush those on whom it is put. . .,"" and
the need to set rules that are both feasible to execute and certain in their
results.7" The court expressed concern that holding Pepsico liable would
subject broadcasters and advertisers to liability when children imitated
acts of violence which they saw on television.76 The court also contended
that there would be no standard to measure liability.77
The Florida court asserted that "[t]here is no decision in the United
States which has imposed liability under facts analogous to those in the
instant case."7" The court stated that the cases Sakon had cited were
Federal Trade Commission consent orders which did not establish a legal
standard of duty or legal precedent.7 9 The court further distinguished
the cases, noting they "involved alleged advertising problems which were
68. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 12 (Fla. 1989)
(quoting Sakon, slip op. at 7).
69. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 8.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 8 (Fla. 1989).
74. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 9 (quoting 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.4, 131-32 (2d ed. 1986)).
75. Id.
76. Id., 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 8.
77. Id. See Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.Fla. 1979) (re-
jecting claim that minor plaintiff developed a sociopathic personality by watching violence on
television).
78. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 9 (Fla. 1989).
79. Id
1991]
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directly related to the use of the products themselves."" ° The court then
concluded that "[t]he Pepsico commercial cannot be deemed to consti-
tute false, misleading, or deceptive advertising so as to fall within the
scope of the Florida laws on deceptive and unfair trade practices."8 "
III. CONTRARY PRECEDENT: WEIRUM V. RKO GENERAL, INC.
The Supreme Court of Florida asserted that no decision in the
United States had imposed liability under facts analogous to those in Sa-
kon. s2  This assertion is inaccurate. In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 3
the Supreme Court of California imposed liability on a radio station for a
wrongful death proximately caused by a broadcast which created an un-
due risk of harm to the decedent.8 4 Sakon's attorney had cited
Weirum. s5 Pepsico's attorney had tried to distinguish it. 6 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court of Florida ignored it although the court itself had
previously cited Weirum in Griffin v. State of Florida"8 7
In Weirum, KHJ, a Los Angeles radio station with a large teenage
audience, initiated a contest in which the first listener who reached the
radio station's traveling disc jockey won a prize.88 The purpose of the
contest was to increase advertising revenue by making the station "more
exciting;"8 9 thus, attracting a larger audience.90 The station broadcast
the disc jockey's various locations.91
While pursuing the disc jockey in their cars, two teenagers tried to
outmaneuver one another.92 One of them forced the decedent Weirum's
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
84. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 51, 539 P.2d at 42. It seems remarkable that the Florida
Supreme Court omitted any reference to Weirum. Sakon's attorney had relied on the case.
Initial Brief of Appellants in the Supreme Court of Florida at 15-16, Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc.,
553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 73,258) (Fla. 1989). Also, the Florida Supreme
Court itself had cited Weirum in Griffin v. State of Florida, 414 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (1982), in
support of their opinion that a judge had acted properly when he recalled the jury for previ-
ously omitted instructions four hours after it had begun deliberating.
85. Initial Brief for Appellants in the Supreme Court of Florida at 15-16, Sakon v. Pepsico,
Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 73,258) (Fla. 1989).
86. Answer Brief of Appellee in the Supreme Court of Florida at 34-35, Sakon v. Pepsico,
Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 73,258) (Fla. 1989).
87. Griffin v. State of Florida, 414 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1982). See supra note 84.
88. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975).
89. Id. at 44.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 45.
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car off the highway, killing him.93 In a suit filed by the decedent's surviv-
ing wife and children, the jury reached a verdict against KHJ and one of
the teenagers for $300,000.94 KHJ appealed.95
In contrast to the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Sakon, the
Supreme Court of California held that the broadcaster owed the victim a
duty of due care.96 It noted that while the question of duty must be
decided on a case-by-case basis, 97 every case is controlled by the general
rule that "all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others
from being injured as a result of their conduct." ' In concluding that
KHJ had created an unreasonable risk of harm to the victim,99 the court
stated that "[rieckless conduct by youthful contestants, stimulated by the
radio station's broadcast, constituted the hazard to which decedent was
exposed.""to
The California court noted that foreseeability of the risk must be
considered in establishing duty, 10' but "[w]hile duty is a question of law,
foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury."'°2 The court's "review of
the jury's finding was limited to the determination whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support
the conclusion reached by the jury.'
0 3
The Supreme Court of California concluded "that the record amply
supports the finding of foreseeability."' ° Noting that the contest had
been aired during the middle of summer when youths were out of school
and responsive to relief from vacation boredom,' °5 the court found it
foreseeable that the radio station's young listeners, attracted by the
93. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 45, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975).
94. Id.
95. Id. KHJ appealed from the judgment and from an order denying its motion notwith-
standing the verdict. Id.
96. Id. at 46, 49, Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164.
97. Id. at 46.
98. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 41, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975) (citing Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 48 Cal. 2d 30, 36, 286 P.2d 21 (1955)).
99. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 47, 539 P.2d 36, 41, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975).
100. Id. at 47.
101. Id. at 46 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968)).
102. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975) (citing Wright v. Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 277, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1964)).
103. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 40.
104. Id.
105. Id
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money and a little, brief notoriety,'I° would ignore highway safety and
race to win the prize.1"7
The court stated that "[1liability is imposed only if the risk of harm
resulting from the act is deemed unreasonable-[that is,] if the gravity
and likelihood of the danger outweigh the utility of the conduct in-
volved."' °8 Using this balancing test, the court decided that the risk of
death or serious injury as a result of a high speed car chase outweighed
the commercial rewards or entertainment value of the contest." The
court found that the broadcaster could have achieved its goals by select-
ing a format for the contest that would not have created a risk of harm to
motorists. 110
The Weirum court was not persuaded that imposing such a duty
would "lead to unwarranted extensions of liability."' The court distin-
guished the contest from ordinary business activities as "a competitive
scramble in which the thrill of the chase to be the one and only victor
was intensified by the live broadcasts which accompanied the pursuit."
'"12
Rejecting the broadcaster's argument that the contest was protected by
the first amendment, the California court stated that "[t]he issue here is
civil accountability for the foreseeable results of a broadcast which cre-
ated an undue risk of harm to decedent. The first amendment does not
sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by
word, rather than act.""' 3
IV. SAKON IN LIGHT OF THE WEIRUM DECISION
The Supreme Court of Florida, following United States Supreme
Court decisions, 14 reversed the district court's first amendment ruling" 5
and concluded that the free speech clause did not bar Pepsico's liabil-
106. Id at 47.
107. Id
108. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 47, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975) (citing PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1977) at 146-149).
109. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 48, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975).
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id
113. Id
114. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 165-66, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 5 (Fla. 1989)
(citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) which summarized
the relevant law).
115. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 7 (Fla. 1989).
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ity. I 6 When the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the certified ques-
tion of duty, however, it adopted the district court's negligence
analysis." 7 By doing so, it erected an unsound policy barrier to Pep-
sico's liability.
The court's negligence analysis encompasses three basic flaws.
First, the court apparently failed to seriously consider a key fact in the
case: the age of the fourteen-year-old victim who was targeted for Pep-
sico's commercial. Second, the court failed to distinguish between com-
mercial and noncommercial broadcasts in its negligence analysis.
Finally, the court failed at times to recognize that the Mountain Dew
commercial, and not Mountain Dew soda, was the Pepsico product at
issue.
1. The Court Failed to Consider Michael's Age
One flaw in the court's negligence analysis was its failure to seri-
ously consider the age of the fourteen-year-old victim who was targeted
for Pepsico's commercial." 8 In finding Pepsico not liable, the court
stated that "Pepsico's commercial ha[d] done nothing more than portray
young people engaged in a sporting activity which can be dangerous if
not done by skilled persons under proper conditions.""' 9 The phrase,
"nothing more than," serves to negate in a conclusory manner the possi-
bility that the activity shown might have created an unreasonable risk of
harm to the victim.
Michael was only fourteen years old at the time he saw the commer-
cial' 2° and attempted what even the court viewed as a "sporting activ-
ity."'' As a result, he broke his neck and was rendered a
quadriplegic.' 22 Pepsico had not warned him of the risk' 23 and the four-
teen-year-old boy had not perceived the danger.'24 Professors Prosser
and Keeton noted that "[c]hildren generally do not have the same capac-
ity to perceive, appreciate and avoid dangerous situations which is pos-
sessed by the ordinary, prudent adult."' 25 Accordingly, a jury might
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 164.
120. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 2 (Fla. 1989).
121. Id. at 166.
122. Initial Brief for Appellants in the Supreme Court of Florida at 1-2, Sakon v. Pepsico,
Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 73,258) (Fla. 1989).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1.
125. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON THE LAW OF TORTS, 179 n.45 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting
Dorais v. Paquin, 98 N.H. 159, 304 A.2d 369, 371 (1973)).
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have decided that the risk was reasonably foreseeable but, unlike the
Supreme Court of California in Weirum, the Florida Supreme Court did
not permit the question of foreseeability to go to the jury. 126 The court
decided that as a matter of law, "Sakon's accident was not the foresee-
able consequence of Pepsico's advertisement."'
' 27
The California court's reasoning in Weirum supports a conclusion
that Michael Sakon's attempt to lake jump was foreseeable.' 28 The
Mountain Dew commercial showed young actors performing the danger-
ous activity portrayed as an exciting sport accompanied by upbeat music.
Additionally, the commercial was aired during times of the day intended
to reach and influence young people.' 29 The commercial obviously
reached and influenced Michael.' 3° When attractive peers encouraged
young jumpers and cheered their success,13 they also encouraged
Michael, and there was nothing in the commercial to warn him of the
risk. '32 Additionally, the dangerous activity was performed on a bicycle.
Many American teenagers own bicycles and are skillful riders. Bicycles
are familiar possessions that can instill a false sense of security and in-
crease the risk that a youngster might try the "sport" without being
aware of its danger. The Florida court itself perceived the dangerous
activity as a "sporting activity;"' 33 thus, it is foreseeable that a fourteen-
year-old boy might do the same. Professors Prosser and Keeton wrote in
regard to the functions of court and jury, "[t]he most common statement
is that if reasonable persons may differ as to the conclusion to be drawn,
the issue must be left to the jury; otherwise it is for the court."'' 34  Rea-
sonable persons might differ as to the foreseeability of Michael Sakon's
attempt to lake jump, but the issue did not go to a jury.
The age of the audience was a key factor in the Weirum court's
reasoning. 135 The young listeners who were found to have foreseeably
ignored highway safety were seventeen and nineteen years old. 136 Both
listeners were old enough to drive; one was old enough to vote. Michael
126. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (Fla. 1989).
127. Id.
128. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
129. Sakon, 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (quoting Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc.,
No. 88-3207, slip op. at 3-4).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 166.
134. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 125, at 238.
135. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 43, 46-47, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1975).
136. Id. at 45.
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Sakon was only fourteen; 13 7 he was even less able to perceive the risk.
The duty in Weirum, was to a non-listener harmed by the conduct
of others which was stimulated by a radio broadcast.138 Michael Sakon
was an actual viewer of the Mountain Dew commercial;1 39 his conduct
was directly stimulated by the televised advertisement. 140 According to
the Weirum guidelines, he is clearly a foreseeable plaintiff.' 4 ' Addition-
ally, television is more influential than radio and has a far greater impact.
The Sakon court erred in its policy analysis by failing to consider
the young victim's interest. The case was decided on policy issues but
the rationale was unsound. The Florida court noted that the doctrine of
proximate cause is based on policy decisions which include the "practical
need to draw the line somewhere so that liability will not crush those on
whom it is put"' 42 and "the need to work out rules that are feasible to
administer, and yield a workable degree of certainty."' 4 3 The Florida
court also stated that "there must be some limit on the kinds of injuries
for which another must pay compensation." ''  In this case, the court
drew the line in the wrong place. The court's policy decision failed to
consider the victim's age or society's interest in protecting its young who
are less able to protect themselves.'"1 The court was concerned that im-
posing liability might crush Pepsico, but not that a failure to do so might
crush the young victim. Michael Sakon's attempt to perform the stunt
he saw in Pepsico's commercial physically, economically and emotion-
ally devastated him.
Strong public policy arguments can support a finding that Pepsico
owed a duty of due care to Michael Sakon and was liable for breaching
that duty. Imposing liability would send a message of responsiblity to
corporations and encourage advertisers to broadcast safer commercials.
Moreover, it would place the burden on the advertiser, who is better able
to spread the risk, instead of on the innocent young plaintiff. 1 46 It would
137. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (Fla. 1989).
138. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 40, 47, 539 P.2d at 40.
139. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 2.
140. Id.
141. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 125, at 284-85.
142. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166 (quoting 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 20.4, 131-32 (2d ed. 1986)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 167, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 9.
145. Sakon argued that "under Florida law that when children are involved, the amount or
quality of care owed is increased .... Initial Brief of Appellants in the Supreme Court of
Florida at 5-6, Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 73,258)
(Fla. 1989).
146. This is one of the policy justifications for strict liability in tort. "This can be regarded
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afford greater protection to our children who are less able to protect
themselves.
If the Sakon court had employed the balancing test used in
Weirum, '47 it might have found that the risk of death or serious injury
occurring as a result of an adolescent's trying to perform the dangerous
activity outweighed the monetary rewards of using that activity in the
commercial. Pepsico could have achieved its goal of selling Mountain
Dew soda by portraying a safer activity or by including a warning that
the activity was dangerous and viewers should not attempt it. Further-
more, the cost to Pepsico to do so would have been minimal.
Unlike the California court, the Florida court did not employ the
balancing test. 4 Although the Florida court admitted that the activity
"can be dangerous if not done by skilled persons under proper condi-
tions[,]"' 49 it nevertheless declined to find that Pepsico had a duty to
warn Michael Sakon of the danger or that it had created an unreasonable
risk of harm.'5 0 Judging from the decision in Weirum, had Sakon been
decided in California, the result might have been different.
a. Advertisements Create A Duty: F W. Woolworth v. Kirby
In F W Woolworth v. Kirby, '5' a store broadcast thirty-second ra-
dio spots and bought newspaper space as part of a promotional advertis-
ing scheme"' in which ping pong balls containing prizes were to be
dropped from a plane onto the store's parking lot.' 53 Mrs. Kirby, a sev-
enty-year-old woman who went to the store with her small grandson, was
injured when someone in the large crowd knocked her to the ground.'54
The Supreme Court of Alabama held that when a storekeeper causes a
large crowd to gather as a result of his advertisements:
that person owes a duty to exercise reasonable care commensu-
rate with foreseeable danger or injury to protect those assem-
bled from injuries resulting from the ... activities of the crowd
or individuals within the crowd; that the foreseeability of dan-
ger or injury under such circumstances is for jury determina-
as a fairness and justice reason of policy." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 125, at 692-
93.
147. 539 P.2d at 40.
148. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
149. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 8 (Fla. 1989).
150. Id.
151. F. W. Woolworth v. Kirby, 302 So. 2d 67 (Ala. 1974).
152. Id. at 68.
153. Id
154. Id.
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tion; and that reasonable care commensurate with the
foreseeability of danger or injury may require greater precau-
tions when children or the elderly are present.1 55
In contrast to the Sakon court, the Woolworth court found that the
advertiser had a duty to its victim under the facts of the case.'5 6 This
holding reflects a sound policy rationale because it afforded substantial
protection for Alabama residents while the Sakon decision provided none
for Florida children.
b. Foreseeability and the Failure to Adequately Warn as Jury
Questions: Haberly v. Reardon Co.
Haberly v. Reardon Co., 157 like Sakon, involved an injury to a minor
and an alleged failure to adequately warn of a risk of harm."', In
Haberly, the Supreme Court of Missouri, sitting en banc and interpreting
New York law, reached a decision contrary to Sakon. 59 The court held
that the jury should decide whether a paint manufacturer could have
reasonably foreseen that paint was likely to get into the eyes of a user or
of his twelve-year-old son who was helping him.' I The court also held
that the jury could decide the necessity for and the adequacy of a warn-
ing concerning the paint1 6 1 and the question of whether the manufac-
turer's failure to adequately warn was, in fact, a cause which contributed
to the loss of sight in the boy's eye.1
62
The Haberly court's reasoning is applicable to the unusual facts of
Sakon. The court noted that although the way in which the paint en-
tered the boy's eye might be described as unusual, peculiar, unique, bi-
zarre, or even as a "freak accident,"' 163 the jury reasonably could have
found the risk foreseeable. 164 The court stated that:
bizarre accidents are far from unlikely, and recovery cannot be
denied because of the uniqueness of the happenings.... [I]f we
feel the defendant at least somewhat culpable in failing to take
155. Id. at 71. The court reversed and remanded the case because the trial court had erred
in not allowing testimony as to a collective fact question. Id. at 73.
156. F. W. Woolworth v. Kirby, 302 So. 2d 67, 71 (Ala. 1974).
157. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 863.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 868.
162. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859, 868 (Mo. 1958).
163. Id at 864.
164. Id. The boy, responding to his father's call, apparently rose from a kneeling position,
swung or stepped toward his father, and started to kneel again to clean a brick. In the process,
the boy's eye came in contact with his father's brush. Id. at 861.
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the simple step of a warning, then we see no reason to take the
case from the jury when the consequences are serious, and, be-
cause serious, are unexpected. We think, therefore, that the is-
sue of the defendant's negligence was properly left to the
jury.
1 6 5
Application of the Haberly court's reasoning regarding the role of
the jury is appropriate in Sakon because Pepsico was "at least somewhat
culpable in failing to take the simple step of a warning .. .,,6 and
Michael's injuries were indisputably serious - he was rendered a
quadriplegic. 167 Accordingly, the issues of foreseeability and the failure
to adequately warn should have gone to a jury.
168
Furthermore, in affirming the jury's verdict, the Haberly court
stated that
[i]f there is some probability of harm sufficiently serious that
ordinary men would take precautions to avoid it, then failure to
do so is negligence . . . . The test is not of the balance of
probabilities, but of the existence of some probability of suffi-
cient moment to induce action to avoid it on the part of a rea-
sonable mind.
169
Reasonable minds could have found that the Mountain Dew commercial
created "some probability of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary men
would take precautions to avoid it .... ,"0 If the Florida court had
applied this test, it would not have denied Michael Sakon his cause of
action. He would have had his day in court.
2. The Court Failed to Distinguish Between Commercial and
Noncommercial Broadcasts
The Sakon court's failure to distinguish between commercial and
noncommercial broadcasts in its negligence analysis may have contri-
buted to its fear of unlimited liability.1 7' It had rejected Pepsico's argu-
ment that recognizing a cause of action would involve the court in an
analysis of all commercial and noncommercial television broadcasts.
The court had asserted that by "using common sense,"' 7 2 it could easily
165. Id. at 864-65.
166. Id. at 864.
167. Initial Brief of Appellants in the Supreme Court of Florida at 2, Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc.,
553 So. 2d 163, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (No. 73,258) (Fla. 1989).
168. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Mo. 1958).
169. Id. at 865 (quoting Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F.2d at 183, 185 [1], 186 [3]).
170. Id.
171. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 165-66, 1989 Fla. LEXIS at 8.
172. Id. at 166.
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differentiate between the two.173 Nevertheless, the court failed to do so
when it concluded that it could not find Pepsico liable because "[t]he
logical corollary to recovery in this case would be that advertisers and
broadcasters would be subject to liability because children sought to du-
plicate acts of violence which they saw on television. There would be a
total absence of any standard to measure liability."' 174 These statements
are inaccurate. Recovery in Sakon would not subject broadcasters to lia-
bility for material depicted in any noncommercial broadcast 175 and it
would subject advertisers to liability only when their commercials create
an unreasonable risk of harm to their viewers. The court cited Zamora v.
Columbia Broadcasting System,176 a case involving noncommercial tele-
vision in which a claim that a minor plaintiff developed a sociopathic
personality by watching violence on television was rejected. 177
In contrast to the Florida court's statement that there would be no
standard to measure liability, the Weirum court had no difficulty arriving
at a standard when it found the Los Angeles broadcaster liable.'17  In
regard to the particular standard of conduct in a case, according to
Professors Prosser and Keeton,
the details of the standard must be filled in in each particular
case. The question then is what the reasonable person would
have done under the circumstances. Under our system of pro-
cedure, this question is to be determined in all doubtful cases by
the jury, because the public insists that its conduct be judged in
part by the man in the street rather than by lawyers, and the
jury serves as a shock-absorber to cushion the impact of the
law. 179
3. The Mountain Dew Commercial: The Pepsico Product at Issue
The Florida court failed to fully appreciate that the Mountain Dew
commercial was the Pepsico product at issue in the litigation. When the
court reasoned that "[t]he product being advertised had nothing to do
173. Id.
174. Id. See Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.Fla. 1979).
The Florida court also failed to distinguish commercial from noncommercial material when it
adopted the trial court's comparison of the foreseeability of Sakon's conduct with the foresee-
ability of an observer attempting high wire and trapeze acts performed by circus actors on
noncommercial television. Id. at 167 (quoting Sakon, slip opn. at 6).
175. Id at 165-66.
176. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
177. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166.
178. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975).
179. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supro note 125, at 237.
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with the activity[,] ' "'8 it appeared to be focusing on Mountain Dew it-
self. It would be incorrect to state that the commercial had nothing to do
with the activity because the commercial portrayed the activity.'' The
certified question of law referred specifically to the commercial depicting
the dangerous activity and did not mention the soda.182 Sakon had al-
leged that the commercial depicting the dangerous activity induced him
to try to perform the stunt. 83 He never claimed that the soda caused the
harm. The statement is also inaccurate if "the product being adver-
tised""' refers to the soda because the activity was used to sell the
soda. 1
85
The court also stated that "the advertisement was not directed to-
ward encouraging viewers to undertake the sport but only to drink
'Mountain Dew.' "186 It is difficult to understand why the court sug-
gested that the advertisement must be "directed toward encouraging
viewers to undertake the sport"'' 8 for Sakon to state a cause of action
based on negligence. Negligence, by definition, is not an intentional
tort. 88 It does not require intent.8 9 "Negligence is conduct, and not a
state of mind."'" "In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or
inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of the results
which may follow from his act."'' Pepsico directed the commercial at
young viewers.192 Two activities were encouraged in the ad. First,
young actors expressly encouraged other young actors to perform the
dangerous activity."' Second, the commercial presumably encouraged
the viewers to drink Mountain Dew soda. It could be argued that Pep-
sico had negligently, heedlessly or inadvertently encouraged Sakon to
perform the dangerous act.
180. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 8 (Fla. 1989).
181. Id. at 164.
182. Id
183. Id
184. Id. at 166.
185. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 2 (Fla. 1989).
186. Id. at 166.
187. Id
188. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 125, at 33, 160-61.
189. Id
190. Id. at 169.
191. Id.
192. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181 (Fla. 1989).
193. Id
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V. PROTECTING THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING OF
A MINOR: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Minimizing The Risk To Children: Federal Communications
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation
The United Stated Supreme Court has recognized "the govern-
ment's interest in the 'well-being of its youth'....,"94 In Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, '95 the Court held that
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") had the power to
regulate a radio broadcast that used indecent, although not obscene, lan-
guage at a time of day when children were likely to be listening.196
In that case, a New York radio station owned by Pacifica Founda-
tion broadcast a monologue entitled "Filthy Words" at about two
o'clock in the afternoon on October 30, 1973.197 A man complained to
the Federal Communications Commission that he had heard the broad-
cast while driving with his young son.1 98 Because the offensive language
was "'broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audi-
ence (i.e., in the early afternoon),'1 99 and . . .was 'deliberately broad-
cast,' ,20 the Commission held that the words aired were indecent and
prohibited.2"'
The Court noted two reasons that broadcasting's first amendment
protection is the most limited of all the communications media.20 2 The
first was that "the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive
presence on the lives of all Americans. 2 3 The second is that "broad-
casting is uniquely accessible to children . ..."I The Court stated that
children's easy access to broadcast material, combined with the concerns
expressed in Ginsberg,205 "amply justify special treatment of indecent
194. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (quot-
ing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-640 (1968)).
195. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
196. Id. at 750-51.
197. Id at 729-730.
198. Id. at 730.
199. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (quoting 56
F.C.C. 2d 94, 99).
200. Id. (quoting 56 F.C.C. 2d at 99); also, children often have access when they are not
supervised by their parents. See id. at 731, n.2 (quoting 56 F.C.C. at 97).
201. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978).
202. Id. at 748.
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id at 750 (1978) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-640 (1968)).
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broadcasting."2 °" The Court emphasized that their holding was nar-
row.2 07 The time of day the indecent material was broadcast was cru-
cial.2 °8 Their purpose was to minimize the risk that children would be
exposed to indecent language. 2°9 Surely, protecting children from the
risk of physical harm is at least as important as protecting them from
indecent language. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida made no
attempt to protect them.
The Florida court was concerned about imposing crushing liability
on broadcast advertisers. 210  The economic impact of the Supreme
Court's finding in Pacifica was potentially far greater on the broadcaster
than a finding of liability would have been on Pepsico. Pacifica was
based on a nuisance rationale.211 If subsequent complaints were filed, the
broadcaster was susceptible to having its license revoked or to having its
license renewal denied.212 If that happened, Pacifica would lose its right
to broadcast and the ownership of its stations.21 It would then be off the
air and out of business. Pepsico, on the other hand, would only have had
to compensate Michael Sakon for his injuries.
B. The Welfare Of Children Comes First: New York v. Ferber
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its concern for the wel-
fare of children in New York v. Ferber.214 The issue in Ferber was "the
constitutionality of a New York criminal statute which prohibits persons
from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the
age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such performances. ' 215
Paul Ferber, a Manhattan bookstore owner, had been found guilty of
violating the statute by selling to an undercover police officer two films
depicting young boys performing sexual acts.2 16 The statute did not re-
quire proof that the films were obscene.217 The New York Court of Ap-
peals held that the statute violated the first amendment and reversed
206. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found. 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (citing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-640 (1968)).
207. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found. 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1978).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 750 n.28.
210. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 166, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 8 (Fla. 1989).
211. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
212. Id. at 730 n.1 (citing 56 F.C.C. at 99).
213. Id.
214. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
215. Id. at 749.
216. Id. at 751-752.
217. Id.
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Ferber's conviction.218
The United States Supreme Court decided that "[a]s applied to Paul
Ferber and to others who distribute similar material, the statute does not
violate the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Four-
teenth."2" 9 The Court recognized that laws that prohibit the dissemina-
tion of child pornography risk violating the first amendment.220
Nevertheless, the Court was "persuaded that the States are entitled to
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of chil-
dren' 221 for several reasons:
First. It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a
State's interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor" is "compelling. ' 2 2 "A democratic soci-
ety rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens. "223 Ac-
cordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the
physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws
have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected
rights .... The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment
found in the relevant literature, is that the use of children as
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiologi-
cal, emotional, and mental health of the child. 224 That judg-
ment, we think, easily passes muster under the First
Amendment.225
The Court concluded its discussion of the fifth and final reason for
its decision by stating that when the material covered by the statute in
question "bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children en-
gaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is
clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materials as
without the protection of the First Amendment." '226
The United States Supreme Court considered the welfare of children
so important that a constitutionally protected right gave way.227 The
218. Id.
219. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982).
220. Id. at 756.
221. Id
222. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
223. Id. at 757 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
224. Id. at 758 n.9 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-438, p.5 (1977)).
225. Id. at 756-58. The Court supported its decision with four additional reasons.
226. Id at 764.
227. Id
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Supreme Court of Florida did not consider the welfare of children in
Sakon. Their protection gave way.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida erred when it concluded that Pepsico
could not be held legally liable.228 Had the court considered the age of
the victim and that of the targeted audience as other courts have done
when deciding questions of duty, policy, and foreseeability, it might have
rendered a different decision. The Supreme Court of Florida made an
unsound policy decision. Sound policy rationale suggests that courts
must hold broadcast advertisers to the general duty not to create an un-
reasonable risk of harm to their young viewers and to a duty to warn
when they air "a commercial depicting a dangerous activity in a manner
likely to induce a young viewer to imitate the activity., 229 Broadcast
advertisers do not need special protection; children do. The Florida
Supreme Court has, in effect, granted broadcast advertisers a license to
air commercials in Florida that may create an unreasonable risk of harm
to young viewers. Network advertisers must be aware, however, that im-
munity in Florida will not shield them from liability for negligence in
California and other states.
Marilyn Sipes*
228. Id.
229. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1181, 1 (Fla. 1989)
(quoting Sakon, slip op. at 5).
* The author dedicates this Note to her husband, Don Sipes.
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